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SELF-REGULATION FOR ONLINE
AUCTIONS:  AN ANALYSIS
Cecil Eng Huang Chua









Fraud:  A misrepresentation or concealment with reference to some fact material to a transaction that is made
with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity and with the intent to deceive another
and that is reasonably relied on by the other who is injured thereby
 Stanley and Stern 1995
Abstract
The most prevalent form of Internet fraud is auction fraud. As fraud affects both the profits of Internet auction
houses as well as honest traders of auction goods, they have a mutual incentive to reduce fraud. However,
existing research suggests that little effort has been made by the Internet auction industry to control fraud. As
a result, there have been increasing calls for government intervention to regulate the Internet auction
marketplace.  In this study, we perform a grounded theory analysis of fraud in the Internet auction marketplace.
Specifically, this research explores the institutions that experienced traders and auction houses employ to
reduce the incidence of fraud. Preliminary evidence suggests that, contrary to common perception, the Internet
auction industry has developed many sophisticated institutions for combating fraud.  These institutions operate
primarily by reducing information asymmetries that con artists exploit.  However, due to the ease of entry into
Internet auction markets, new entrants become easy prey for con artists. 
1 INTRODUCTION
Auctions are one of the few successful new business models enabled by the Internet (van Heck and Vervest 1998).  Internet
auctions are also the leading source of online fraud (National Fraud Information Center 2002).  The literature has suggested that
attempts by online auction houses to control fraud have been perfunctory (Snyder 2000).  As a result, various groups have made
increasingly strident calls for government regulation of the Internet auction business (Bywell and Oppenheim 2001). 
However, economic theory would predict that both Internet auction houses1 and the traders of auction goods have strong incentives
to reduce fraud.  We attempt to resolve this discrepancy through an analysis of Internet auction practice.  Specifically, we seek
to delineate (1) the institutions that the Internet auction industry (including both auction houses and traders) has enacted to detect
and combat fraud, and (2) the underlying mechanisms that they employ.
As little research in the area has been done, we have conducted a grounded theory analysis of the industry.  Our research
contributes to the literature by demonstrating that, contrary to earlier findings, the Internet auction industry displays a strong
degree of enlightened self-interest and, as a result, is highly self-regulated.  We have discovered that sophisticated anti-fraud
institutions have already been established, and, as a consequence, fraud primarily victimizes new entrants in the market who are
unfamiliar with these mechanisms. 
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2 RELATED RESEARCH
Three areas of research are directly relevant to the Internet auction fraud problem:  (1) auction theory, (2) the economics of self-
regulation, and (3) current online auction practices. 
2.1 Auction Theory
Auction theory has long fascinated economists because slight variations in auction rules can dramatically impact auction behavior.
For example, variations in the ability to enter a market (McAfee and McMillan 1992), and transaction costs (Ginsburgh 1998)
all lead to disparities in expected results. 
Internet auctions are an interesting special case of auctions, as they are a new form of market and have significant economic
impact.  Considering fraud, Internet auctions are distinct due to: 
 High degree of anonymity.  In other kinds of auctions, natural means of user authentication exist.  For example, in the
electronic Dutch flower auctions, user-established EDI links authenticated them (van Heck 1997). As Internet auctions are
conducted using existing infrastructure, no such authentication barriers exist.  As a result, it is easy for dishonest traders to
avoid prosecution. 
 Relaxed legal constraints.  Other kinds of auction houses are required by law to hold or validate goods. For example, in
AUCNet, cars and other vehicles are inspected and rated by AUCNet employees prior to the auction (Lee 1997).  In Internet
auctions where similar mechanisms are lacking, dishonest traders can falsely advertise their products. 
 Low costs for entry and exit.  In other kinds of auctions, entry and exit are often expensive. For example, the auction for
U.S. treasury securities requires that first tier participants are regulated members of the international financial community
with significant transaction volumes (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2000).  In most Internet auctions, entry and exit are
effectively costless.  In most cases, sellers are charged a small listing fee and a closing charge (Beam and Segev 1996).  As
a result, dishonest traders are able to move in and out of Internet auction markets with impunity. 
2.2 The Economics of Self-Regulation
Self-regulation is often beneficial for industries with natural information asymmetries such as online auction markets or
professional services (Jacobson 2001).  Self-regulation often improves the quality of goods and services (Leland 1979).  It also
enables the development of standards, thereby lowering communication costs (Dewey 1979).  Self-regulation can also constitute
cartel formation.  Suppliers collude to limit market entry, thereby allowing them to extract monopoly rents (Leland 1979). 
However, self-regulation only can occur when the self-regulating body can enforce policies. Traditional mechanisms for self-
regulation include:
 Monitoring and Enforcement of Regulations:  Incentives are provided to encourage suppliers to both monitor each other,
and to follow regulations (Sethi and Somanathan 1996).  For example, modern professions such as medicine, law, and
accounting revoke the licenses of rogues, preventing them from practicing (Shaked and Sutton 1981). 
 Signaling Mechanisms: Self-regulating industries also create mechanisms that screen market entrants. These screens
encourage adverse selection in favor of desirable participants (Matthews 1991).  For example, the New York Stock
Exchange requires members to purchase a seat on the board before trading. By purchasing a seat, and sharing in the
exchange's profits and losses, a member signals their willingness to behave according to the rules of the exchange (Davis and
Neal 1998).  Likewise, when accountants follow rules prohibiting advertising, they signal a willingness to put the greater
good of the profession over their individual salaries (Matthews 1991).  Signaling mechanisms fail when dishonest parties can
either mimic or exploit the signal to obtain rents.
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2.3 Current Practices
Hence, the Internet auction houses clearly benefit from self-regulation.  First, an increase in the stability of the auction market
leads to an increase in auction demand and, therefore, an increase in auction commissions. Second, self-regulation prevents the
government from establishing market-distorting laws that reduce profits (Oi 1973).  For example, advocates of government
regulation have suggested that Internet auction houses verify every account on their systems (Snyder 2000)a policy that would
be prohibitively expensive.  Finally, fraud can directly impact Internet auction house commissions.  For example, sellers will
sometimes ask for a low bid price, but raise shipping fees, thereby avoiding commissions based on the final bid price.
Legitimate traders of auction goods also have a clear incentive to self-regulate.  A reduction in fraud reduces trader risk, thereby
increasing trader welfare. Furthermore, traders incur costs under government regulation.  As one trader noted: 
If some fool can't wait to be parted from his money, I'm not interested in paying some sort of weird tax, in
effect, so that he can risk what ends up being my money to try to get something for nothing. 
 rec.collecting.cards.discuss posting, August 15, 1999
However, the empirical literature suggests that the Internet auction industry is doing very little to combat fraud (Bywell and
Oppenheim 2001).  Auction fraud is the number one source of Internet fraud (National Fraud Information Center 2002), and many
existing anti-fraud schemes have been criticized for being ineffective (Snyder 2000).  For example, escrow services are only used
for trades of at least $250.00. However, the average selling price of an eBay good is about $30.00 (Lucking-Reiley 2000).  There
is thus a seeming contradiction between traditional theory and actual practice.2
3 RESEARCH DESIGN
This study attempts to resolve the disparity between economic theory and actual Internet auction practice through a grounded
theory analysis of Internet auctions.  Specifically, this study attempts to identify the institutions that the Internet auction industry
has enacted to detect and combat fraud, as well as identifying the underlying mechanisms that make these institutions either
effective or innocuous. 
As very little empirical work on Internet auction fraud has been attempted, grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1990) was
deemed an appropriate methodology. Grounded theory is a cyclical methodology, involving the continual refinement of
hypotheses as new data is gathered. Similarly, data is systematically collected to test and refine the hypotheses. 
3.1 Data Collection
To ensure the cross validation of the data, we collected data from three sources:
 Web Pages Devoted to Auctions:  These included official anti-fraud web pages, such as those of the Internet Fraud
Complaint Center, and personal web pages of experienced traders. 
 Bulletin Board Postings:  These included postings on the bulletin boards of the major Internet auction houses (e.g., eBay,
Yahoo, Amazon), on UseNet news (archived on Google Groups), and postings on the bulletin boards of devoted auction
communities (e.g., the Online Auction Users Association). 
 Auction News Articles:  The media regularly reports about auctions. Sources included general news outlets like CNN, and
the New York Times, and specialized sources such as PCWorld, and CNet Central.
Chua & Wareham/Self-Regulation for Online Auctions
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Actual kinds of fraud
Figure 1.  Theoretical Framework of
Auction Frauda
aWe gratefully acknowledge the contribution of an anony-
mous reviewer in revising this figure.
We began the study by searching through five main sites for the term auction fraudAltaVista and Yahoo (to identify Web
pages and articles), the eBay and Yahoo discussion forums, and Google Groups.  The articles and postings on those sites then
led us to other articles, postings, and organizations.  For example, as we learned more about the auction community, we refined
our search with highly specific terms like Jay Nelson (an infamous con artist), and IFCCFBI (the Internet Fraud Complaint
Center). 
Refinements in the search also led us to other sites and postings of which we would otherwise have been unaware, such as the
EbayExodus Web ring (now largely defunct), AuctionWatch (an auction community), and eSafe2Bid (auction security data mining
software).  Over 42 Megabytes of data on auction fraud were collected.  Google Groups alone has almost 20,000 postings
concerning auction fraud.
3.2 Data Analysis
As is commonly done in grounded theory, we first employed open coding to identify our initial concepts, and steadily refined the
codes as our understanding of auction fraud increased (i.e., axial coding) (Strauss and Corbin 1990).  We have four top level
codes: 
 Fraud Type:  Subcodes include victim, and perpetrator.  Victim in turn is subcoded as buyer, bidder, seller, auction house,
and third-party. Perpetrator is sub-coded as buyer or seller. For example, fencing, where a seller uses the auction to dispose
of stolen merchandise, is perpetrated by the seller against a third-party and the buyer (who by law must return the stolen
merchandise). 
 Formal Institutions:  This identifies institutions enacted by the government, the auction houses, or commercial institutions
unrelated to the trading community of practice that hinder or aid fraud.
 Informal Institutions: This identifies institutions enacted by traders to hinder or aid in fraud.
 Comparison:  This code captures information comparing Internet auctions to other kinds of auctions. For example, the fact
that the Internet auction houses do not prepare merchandise descriptions (and are thereby not responsible for ensuring the
quality of the merchandise) is captured by this code. 
Figure 1 relates how the top-level codes interrelate (selective coding).
The figure first projects that fraud is a phenomenon common to all
markets.  However, the level and nature of fraud is determined by the
specific market conditions.  The formal and informal institutions that
reduce fraud, in turn, influence these market conditions. Thus, Internet
auction fraud can only be understood by comparing Internet auctions to
other kinds of auctions and markets.
By exploring Internet auction fraud in this way, it is possible to then
reason about the characteristics of fraud that exist on Internet auctions.
Furthermore, it is more appropriate to compare Internet fraud with the
actual levels of fraud on other kinds of auctions than to study Internet
auctions in isolation. As one person noted:
Oh sure, oh sure, there's usually a shill in the room at
Sotheby's too. Every place you have an auction you'll
have shills and crooks. If the auction house finds one
they throw them out.3
 misc.invest.stocks posting, February 5, 2002
Chua & Wareham/Self-Regulation for Online Auctions
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4 INTERNET AUCTION FRAUD OVERVIEW
Most Internet auction fraud shares three characteristics: (1) brief transaction time, (2) high value items, and (3) affects a large
number of people. 
Brief Transaction Time. Internet auctions are large virtual public venues.  As a result, scams are discovered very quickly. In
traditional scams, the con artist is often more patient, attempting to gain a victim's trust over time.  However, Internet auction fraud
has a relatively brief duration: 
There is a user on ebay right now that is operating under two names, running three day auctions. This person
requests the buyer to escrow the payment, then buys a camera (or whatever) from a dealer such as Beyond.com,
and has it sent to the buer [sic]. The buyer then releases the escrow. The problem is that the camera was paid
for with a stolen credit card using the buyer's name as the cardholder.
 rec.photo.digital posting, September 24, 1999
High Value Items. While the con artist has to act quickly, a profit must still be made to compensate for his risks.  Thus, con artists
tend to frequent auction markets for high value goods such as the collectibles (e.g., rare beanie babies, coins, stamps, and sports
memorabilia), and electronic goods (e.g., computers) markets.   Interestingly, these markets also attract a large number of con
artists, counterfeiters, and other criminals in the offline world.  As Kevin Pursglove, eBays VP of Communications, noted: 
Sports memorabilia has had a lot of fraudulent activity for yearssuch items also have a high fraud rate in
the offline auction world. More expensive items, such as computers and consumer-electronics products, also
have higher fraud rates.
Interview with Kevin Pursglove by Troy Wolverton of ZDNet, July 1, 2002
To gain traders' confidence, the con artist may first perform legitimate trades in low value goods. For example: 
I see a REAL train wreck coming with [name deleted] 7 over 1800 items, 8 1200 items and other high dollar
Dutch auctions to boot. Reading her feedback (the last Aug. 2nd) all she was selling up til then was FABRIC.
All of the auctions are 3 day
alt.marketing.online.ebay posting, December 13, 2001
Affects Large Numbers of People. The above quote also highlights the final characteristic of auction fraud:  multiple traders
are bilked simultaneously. The con artist has one opportunity to attract a revenue stream, and therefore maximizes the expected
revenue from that single attempt. 
Fraud itself can take multiple forms. Curry (2001) proposes the taxonomy presented in Table 1. 
5 FORMAL MECHANISMS
Both governments and auction houses have enacted formal mechanisms for combating fraud.  As there is convergence in the
auction market, most Internet auction houses now have all of the formal mechanisms: 
Police Action:  The police are only involved in the most expensive fraud cases because time spent recovering the loss is otherwise
not worthwhile. For example, during its first year of prosecution, the Internet Fraud Complaint Center only gave restitution in
four cases.  In these cases, plaintiffs received more than $357,000 (National White Collar Crime Center and Federal Bureau of
Investigation 2001).  Most fraud cases are also cross- jurisdictional requiring complex coordination between police from disparate
geographic regions.  Within the United States alone, fewer than 1 in 4 auction fraud cases occurred in the same state (National
White Collar Crime Center and Federal Bureau of Investigation 2001).
Reputation Systems:  In most Internet auction houses, buyers (winning bidders) and sellers leave public feedback about each
other.  Using such systems, honest traders build a reputation, signaling their honesty. Reputation systems are highly effective,
but are open to abuse.  Fraudulent traders often threaten honest traders with retaliatory feedback.  There have also been recorded
cases of con artists who patiently built up good reputations to commit major swindles. As noted by Susan Grant, director of the
National Consumers Leagues Internet Fraud Watch:
Chua & Wareham/Self-Regulation for Online Auctions
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Table 1.  Auction Fraud Types
1. Shilling Seller bids on own auctions to drive up its price.
2. Bid shielding Two bidders collude on an auction.  One bidder makes a low bid, while the second
makes an inflated bid.  Seconds before the auction ends, the higher bidder withdraws.
3. Misrepresentation Seller intentionally describes an item incorrectly.
4. Fee stacking Seller adds hidden costs such as handling charges to the item after the auction ends.
5. Failure to ship Seller never sends the goods.
6. Failure to pay Buyer never sends the money.
7. Reproductions and
counterfeits
Seller advertises counterfeit goods as the real thing.
8. Triangulation/fencing Stolen goods are sold.
9. Buy and switch Buyer receives merchandise and refuses it.  However, buyer switches original
merchandise with inferior merchandise.
10. Loss or damage claims Buyer claims item was damaged and buyer disposed of it.  Buyer wants money back.
11. Shell auction Seller sets up an auction solely to obtain names and credit cards.
One problem with feedback forms is that the feedback can suddenly change and someone may have a positive
feedback rating one minute, and then if all of [a] sudden there are problems reported, it can change that
feedback to be negative.
 CNN Interview, September 28, 2000
However, building up a reputation is expensive as every successful trade incurs costs.  As a result, most of the artificially high
reputations are built through trades in low value items and are identifiable by savvy traders.
Complaints to Auction Houses:  Most Internet auction houses have official complaint systems.  However, these official systems
are often deluged with non-fraud complaints.  Internet auction houses also have to proceed cautiously, because of their legal
exposure when they make an error.  As Kevin Pursglove, eBay's VP of Communications, noted: 
We try to move as fast as we can, once we have what we believe is a legitimate body of evidence.
 New York Times Interview, April 19, 2001
Insurance:  Most of the major auction houses provide free insurance to buyers. However, the insurance amount is often capped
at a small sum (on EBay, $200 less a $25 deductible). 
Escrow:  An escrow service protects the buyer by ensuring that the seller only receives payment when the buyer is satisfied.  An
escrow service works as follows.  The buyer pays money to the escrow service, which then notifies the seller that the money has
been paid.  The seller ships the merchandise to the buyer who then inspects it.  If the buyer is satisfied, the buyer authorizes the
escrow service to release the funds to the seller. Otherwise, the buyer returns the merchandise.
While escrow protects the buyer, it also increases the seller's risk.  Buyer con artists reject the merchandise, but substitute inferior
quality goods in lieu of the original.  As a result, many sellers categorically refuse to utilize the escrow services offered (e.g. ,
http://www.mindspring.com/~bookdealers/noescrow.html). 
Chua & Wareham/Self-Regulation for Online Auctions
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6 INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS
Auction traders have also developed numerous informal institutions to combat fraud. In our investigation, we have identified five
separate informal institutions:
Intermediary:  In the intermediary institution, full-time traders with unsullied reputations resell goods purchased from low
reputation sellers.  In effect, such intermediaries charge a markup for absorbing market risk.  Intermediaries are able to perform
their task for two reasons.  First, because these are high volume traders, they are more able to tolerate the effects of fraud.  Second,
as they are more experienced, they are better able to identify fraudulent transactions: 
Our Trusted Intermediary is [name deleted], who is extremely well known on rec.toys.lego. As the proprietor
of [company, he] has participated in literally thousands of transactions with several hundred people. I am sure
[he] will supply bonafides if you need them, but probably 1/2 of the rec.toys.lego group will vouch for him.
 rec.toys.lego posting, December 12, 1999
The reputations of trusted intermediaries do not just derive from their official auction feedback rating. Frequently, such
intermediaries are active on public forums such as bulletin boards.  As a result, their behavior, mannerisms, and identity are often
public knowledge.  This provides the trusted intermediaries with an incentive not to defraud their customers. 
Collectives:  Traders have also begun to organize into collectives for mutual protection.  Membership in these collectives is by
authentication. Traders submit a home address, telephone number, and other kinds of personal information, and are then subjected
to an investigation by the collective.  One example collective is the Online Auction Users Association (OAUA)
(www.auctionusers.org). 
These collectives not only serve as an authentication service, but also help members when they suspect that a fraud has occurred
by offering advice and support. As one OAUA member who was almost victimized by a fraudulent auction noted: 
All this shilling and bumping bids and stuff.  It just STINKS.Youre all a great group, and Im proud
to be a part of the OAUA.
 OAUA posting, December 14, 1999
Self-Interest:  Experienced traders also act in pure self-interest to reduce fraud.  For example, victims of fraud often band together
temporarily for mutual assistance. By reporting their combined losses, they often can motivate authorities to act against a con
artist.
Many experienced members of the auction industry also behave in certain ways during auctions to reduce their individual risk
of fraud.  For example, many experienced bidders engage in snipe bidding (bidding only at the end of an auction) to overcome
shilling.  As one experienced auctioneer noted: 
SNIPE your bids!  The closer to the end of the auction that you place your bid, the less likely you are to be
SHILLED. For instance, placing your bid 10 seconds before the auction closes would practically ensure you
wouldn't be shilled AFTER placing your bid, as there isn't enough time.
 webpage at basestealer.com
The Internet auction houses have also acted in a self-interested way to reduce their exposure to fraud. Auction houses primary
source of revenue is their commissions, which are a percentage of the final price. To avoid such fees, sellers will artificially boost
their stated shipping costs.  Bidders then lower their bids to compensate. 
Partly as a result, the auction houses have begun to purchase interests in electronic payment systems. For example, eBay has a
controlling interest in Billpoint (now eBay payments).4  As commissions on the payment systems are a percentage on the total
sale price, the auction houses are able to extract some of the rents owed through this form of fraud.
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Charities:  Many experienced traders also devote their time and energy to tracking and exposing fraud.  Sometimes, these traders
work with the authorities to shut down fraudulent traders: 
EBay finally yanked [name deleted] 40 fraudulnt [sic]  auctions after 4 days of effort on our behalf!!! Thanks
to the groundswell of pressure from a lot of you regarding them!!! Thank you so much for all of your letters
and support. I have received over 500 eMails from all of you and I forwarded most of them to both the FBI and
NBC News who were instrumental in getting these auctions closed down.
 rec.music.makers.bass posting, July 30, 1999
In other cases, these traders attempt to warn people away from fraudulent auctions.  For example: 
Things I (and others) think you should know about [name deleted] before you decide to send payment. a) the
seller has listed hundreds of items, all high demand, and all with too good to be true prices, he has no history
of this type of selling. b) sellers 70+ positive feedbacks (except for a few) are all for BUYING low priced items,
most less than a dollar, NOT for selling
 alt.marketing.online.ebay posting, August 30, 2001
To work successfully, these charities comprise multiple individuals working together. By working as a group, they reduce the
individual cost of monitoring fraudulent transactions.  Also, charities in effect pay for their monitoring through advertising.
Rescued traders are often willing to transact future business with members of the charities. 
Vigilante:  Traders that perform charitable acts tread a thin line as their actions can be construed as interfering with an auction,
a violation on most Internet auction houses.  Thus, many charities grow disenchanted and turn vigilante, bypassing formal
mechanisms to shut down fraudulent auctions.  These vigilante groups actively interfere with fraudulent auctions in violation of
the rules of many auction sites.  In some cases, vigilante groups even commit fraud by bidding with no intent of purchase.  As
one vigilante posted: 
You peole [sic] have been hammering all over the scammers auctions in the high price laptop and cameras!
.Everyone is getting all kinds of questions thrown at them from escrow refusals to serial numbers.WAY TO
GO!!!  WOOOOOHOOOOOOO!!
 Yahoo BBS posting, January 24, 2002
Such vigilantes actively discourage fraudulent traders and encourage them to move elsewhere: 
Just knowing they are out there and checking can be a deterrent to scam artist w/ equal enforment [sic] for us
mom and poppers as well as the big sellers.
 e-Bay BBS posting, November 16, 2001
However, being vigilante carries substantial risks. Kevin Pursglove, E-Bays VP of Communications, noted that: 
We have had a number of cases where individual users with the best intentions go after the wrong person.
Weve had to suspend a fair number of users over this.
 PCWorld Interview, February 22, 2002
7 DISCUSSION
Table 2 summarizes the above institutions.  Benefits and harms refer to the auction industry members with reduced/increased level
of fraud risk as a result of these institutions.  Combats refers to the fraud type in Currys (2001) taxonomy.
Our investigation suggests that, contrary to earlier findings, the online auction industry is self-regulating.  However, the self-
regulatory mechanisms in place primarily benefit auction participants who are familiar with the system:
People that ask you to do things that are inconsistent with the culture and common practices of a site like e-bay
do so for only one reason, and that is some sort of subtfuge [sic]. 
 OAUA posting, November 7, 2000
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Table 2.  Anti-Fraud Institution
Institution Formal/Informal Benefits Harms Combats Remarks
Police Action Formal Buyer, Seller,
Third Party
5, 6, 7, 8, 11 High value auctions only
Reputation
Systems
Formal Buyer, Seller All except 1,
2
Can be mimicked by con
artist
Complaints Formal Buyer, Seller,
Third Party
All but 4 Limited effectiveness due
to constraints on auction
house
Insurance Formal Buyer Auction house 3, 5, 7, 8 Low value auctions only
Escrow Formal Buyer Seller 3, 5, 6, 7 Exposes seller to 9, 10
Intermediary Informal Buyer, Seller All but 4 Intermediary markup
reflects market value of
reputation and risk
Collective Informal Buyer, Seller All but 4 Participants share
knowledge
Self-Interest Informal All All
Charity Informal All All but 4 Altruistic behavior really
long term profit
maximization
Vigilante Informal All Buyer, Seller All but 4 Sometimes criminal
behavior
New entrants into an auction community are often unaware of the major intermediaries and collectives, and do not have the
sophisticated self-interested strategies that experienced industry players do.  As a result, these are the ones who are often at the
mercy of con artists.  In the following example, the new entrant did not know enough about auction practice to effectively protect
himself and was subsequently berated by an oldtimer.
Tell me, what was it about this sellers feedback that made you feel comfortable sending him money? Was it
his reputation? Was it the comments from previous customers? I'm also curious why you did not use an Escrow
service, as eBay recommends, on a transaction this large? Why you did not use a credit card that would offer
chargeback protection in case of a problem? 
 EBay BBS posting, July 12, 2002
However, these new entrants are in part protected by the charities and vigilantes who expend a cost in tracking down fraudulent
auctions.  The charities and vigilantes in turn are rewarded when the new entrants participate in their auctions. 
Our findings also suggest that the informal institutions are more effective than government regulation could be, because they target
fraud at its source.  Fraud primarily occurs because of information asymmetries, i.e., the con artist knows something auction
participants do not know.  Intermediaries, collectives, and charities reduce these information asymmetries and thereby facilitate
the invisible hand. Regulation, on the other hand, constrains behavior by making unwanted behaviors costly.  However, because
fraud occurs in myriad forms, it is not possible to constrain fraudulent behavior without similarly constraining desirable behavior.
Thus, enacting regulation on the Internet auction market needs to be performed carefully, if at all.  First, such regulations are
unlikely to reduce fraud unless they deal specifically with information asymmetries.  Regulations designed to subsidize trader
risk or punish the con artist are likely to be ineffective.  Second, such regulations may disrupt existing informal anti-fraud
mechanisms, and thus may worsen the incidence of fraud.  Third, regulations are always costly to enact.  Individuals must be paid
Chua & Wareham/Self-Regulation for Online Auctions
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to enforce them, and infrastructure must be installed.  As Internet auction markets are highly elastic (Enos 2001), the enactment
of such regulations can cause the overnight collapse of markets.  Finally, government regulations often have unintended
consequences.  For example, because government regulations transfer the costs of fraud to taxpayers,5 those protected by
government institutions frequently engage in riskier behavior (Calomiris 1990).
This is not to say that informal institutions eliminate fraud.  The individual must be responsible for protecting himself.  The
individual must also realize that in Internet auctions, time is the premium currency.  To be safe, the individual must investigate
the auction, the trader, and the community of practice.  By investing in the community, and following accepted practices, the
trader does much to reduce his own personal fraud risk.
8 CONCLUSION
In this study we have examined the phenomenon of Internet auction fraud using a grounded theory approach. Our analysis
demonstrates that, contrary to findings in prior literature, but in accordance with economic theory, the Internet auction industry
is doing its best to control fraud.  However, anti-fraud institutions are grounded more in auction practices than in formal
institutions. Our study has identified five informal institutions enacted by traders and auction houses alike to combat fraudulent
behavior: auction intermediaries, collectives, self-interested behaviors, charities, and vigilantes. While formal institutions constrain
behavior, these informal institutions primarily function through reducing information asymmetries.
Our study employed grounded theory, and has all of the limitations of that approach.  First, theoretical, and not random sampling
was employed.  As a result, the findings may not be fully representative of auction fraud.  Second, the research was inductive,
and exploratory, and therefore conclusion validity could not be obtained.  Finally, because Economic Man was applied as a
conceptual lens, it is possible that our subjective reality does not coincide with the realist objective reality.  Nevertheless, as
Internet auction fraud is a difficult phenomenon to unearth, and little formal research has been done on the subject, grounded
theory was the most appropriate methodology.
Furthermore, auction fraud is a pressing concern, and our findings will by no means be the last word on the subject.  As future
research, we intend to interview auction participants to identify additional anti-fraud institutions.  In addition, we intend to
empirically test some of the theories discovered in this research.  For example, if auction houses are motivated by enlightened
self-interest, then traders should be willing to segment the market based on their level of risk acceptance.  Distinct market
segments should emerge, where each market segment reflects a willingness of traders to absorb correspondingly higher risk for
correspondingly lower monetary prices.  By triangulating multiple data sources and epistemological traditions, we hope to obtain
a better understanding of the Internet auction fraud phenomenon.  Also, we intend to explore how the various informal anti-fraud
institutions evolved from the Internet auction communities of practice and predict their final form.
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